# wsbx Docker-Sandboxes-style microVMs on Apple Silicon macOS. Each sandbox is a real Linux VM (Virtualization.framework via [vfkit]), booted from any OCI image with a Kata Containers kernel. ```sh brew install vfkit e2fsprogs go # go: builds the static guest tunnel helper cargo install --path . # or grab wsbx-*-darwin-arm64.tar.gz from a release (push a v* tag to build one) wsbx claude # Claude Code in a VM, current dir mounted at the same path wsbx codex | wsbx gemini # other agents (Docker's sandbox-templates images) wsbx pi # pi coding agent, same version + config as on the host wsbx run alpine # bare VM, interactive shell wsbx run -w . ubuntu -- make test # one-off command, exit code propagated wsbx run -p 8000 alpine # host's localhost:8000 reachable as localhost:8000 in the VM wsbx exec NAME # shell in a running sandbox (alias: sh), as the image's user wsbx exec -u root NAME -- apk add git # command, exit code propagated wsbx forward NAME 3000 8080:80 # sandbox's localhost:3000 on the Mac's localhost:3000 (until Ctrl-C; alias fwd) wsbx code NAME # VS Code in the browser, running in the sandbox (until Ctrl-C) wsbx code NAME --desktop # desktop VS Code via Remote-SSH; also: ssh NAME.wsbx wsbx ps # sandboxes: status, CPU, memory, net/block I/O, PIDs, disk, image (alias: ls) wsbx ps -f # same, refreshed every second like `docker stats` wsbx rm NAME... # delete stopped sandboxes; --disk deletes only the disk (fresh on next start) wsbx pull IMAGE wsbx gc # delete cached images no sandbox uses wsbx kernel [--update | --version TAG] # latest Kata release by default, sha256-verified ``` Defaults for `--cpus`/`--memory` come from the host (half the cores, a quarter of RAM up to 8 GiB). Image tags are re-resolved after 24 h (cached copy used when offline); the superseded image is deleted automatically. `WSBX_KATA_VERSION` pins the kernel release. Options: `--name --workspace --cpus --memory --disk --env K[=V] --host-port/-p PORT --fresh --pull --kernel`. **exec**: host → vfkit unix socket (`exec.sock`) → vsock → guest helper. It runs in the workspace dir with the sandbox's env. You get a pty (with resize) when stdin and stdout are terminals, plain pipes otherwise, so `wsbx exec x -- cat f > out` is byte-exact. **forward**: host `127.0.0.1:HOSTPORT` → `exec.sock` → vsock → guest helper → guest `localhost:PORT`, one exec-style session per connection. Works for services bound only to the guest's loopback, on running sandboxes, no restart. `0:PORT` picks a free host port. **code**: browser mode fetches the official VS Code CLI into the sandbox (`~/.wsbx-vscode`, needs internet in the VM) and runs `code serve-web` on the guest's loopback, forwarded like `forward` to a random host port behind a random connection token. The CLI downloads the matching server on first open (glibc or Alpine images). `--desktop` writes `~/.wsbx/ssh_config` (a `NAME.wsbx` host per sandbox) and adds an `Include` for it at the top of `~/.ssh/config` once. ssh reaches an SSH server in the guest helper through `wsbx exec` (`ProxyCommand`): no port, no keys, you're the image user. Remote-SSH then installs its server in the VM as usual. If the VM was killed mid-download and the server won't start, delete `~/.vscode/cli/serve-web` (browser) or `~/.vscode-server` (desktop) in the sandbox. Both need a sandbox started by this wsbx version (the guest helper ships with each start). **Host tunnel** (`-p PORT`): guest `localhost:PORT` → vsock → vfkit → unix socket → host `localhost:PORT`. Nothing listens on a host network interface, and only the listed ports are reachable. **pi**: installs `@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent` at the host's `pi --version` (reinstalls when it changes). On every start it copies these from `~/.pi/agent` with symlinks resolved: settings, models, keybindings, mcp, AGENTS/CLAUDE/SYSTEM md files, extensions, skills, prompts, themes. They're linked into the guest's own `~/.pi/agent`, so host edits win and in-VM edits are discarded. `npm/`, `bin/` (macOS binaries) and sessions stay in the VM. `auth.json` is only copied with `--pi-auth`. Local `baseUrl`s in `models.json` (127.0.0.1/localhost) are tunneled automatically. Agent API keys (`ANTHROPIC_API_KEY`, `OPENAI_API_KEY`, …) are only forwarded with `--keys`. Code in the VM can read them. Sandboxes persist per name (disk under `~/.wsbx/sandboxes`); `--fresh` rebuilds. See `PLAN.md` for design. [vfkit]: https://github.com/crc-org/vfkit ## Security model The VM is the boundary. The guest (including a prompt-injected agent or a malicious image) is assumed hostile. - **Control share** (`/.wsbx/host`): the guest can write to it, so it's recreated empty on every start while the VM is stopped and deleted after exit. Guest outputs are read only as regular files with a size cap; persistent state lives in the host-only `meta.json`. - **vfkit arguments**: paths containing `,` `"` or control characters are refused (vfkit splits options on commas). Workspaces overlapping `~/.wsbx` are refused. - **Registry**: references are validated before any request, digest pins are enforced, and every blob/manifest is sha256-verified. The tag cache is keyed by the exact reference (`a_b:t` and `a/b:t` never share an entry). Auth realms must be https. For public registries, connections to loopback/private/link-local addresses are refused (token realms and redirects included). - **pi config**: allowlisted items only. Symlinks are followed only into `~/.pi/agent` or `~/.agents/skills`, with no cycles and no special files, capped at 256 MB. - **exec**: sessions run as root before dropping to the user, so the guest helper accepts them only from the host's vsock CID, not from guest processes via vsock loopback. - **forward**: listens on the host's loopback only. Browsers don't isolate `localhost` cookies by port, so a forwarded guest page can read non-HttpOnly cookies your other localhost apps set. Forward only what you need. - **code**: the SSH server is only reachable through `wsbx exec` (your user's `~/.wsbx`), so it skips auth, with an ephemeral host key. It allows sessions and host → guest forwarding only; guest → host forwarding (`-R`) and agent forwarding are refused. Desktop VS Code auto-forwards ports the guest opens to your localhost (turn off `remote.autoForwardPorts` if unwanted), and its client trusts the remote server more than a browser tab does. The browser mode has the same localhost-cookie caveat as `forward`. - **Host tunnel**: only the ports you pass with `-p` (or the local `baseUrl`s in pi's `models.json`), over vsock. Remaining risks: - The workspace is read-write. A guest can plant files that run later on the host (`.git/hooks`, `.envrc`, IDE tasks, package scripts). Review changes before running them on the host. - Egress is unrestricted NAT. Anything the VM holds (keys passed with `--keys`, API keys in pi's `models.json`, `--pi-auth`) can be exfiltrated. A host-side credential-injecting egress proxy would fix this; it isn't built yet. - A kernel panic before the root disk mounts (e.g. a corrupt `disk.img`) still restart-loops; panics after boot stop the VM (exit 1). - Image layers are unpacked on the host into one tar, so a decompression bomb can fill the disk.