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Generated
+1
-1
@@ -853,7 +853,7 @@ checksum = "3ad82d2a33cdc9674dc7465672f271e096168fcdbe0f799d9e6db8c5892679dc"
|
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[[package]]
|
||||
name = "wsbx"
|
||||
version = "0.2.0"
|
||||
version = "0.2.2"
|
||||
dependencies = [
|
||||
"anyhow",
|
||||
"clap",
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-1
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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||||
[package]
|
||||
name = "wsbx"
|
||||
version = "0.2.0"
|
||||
version = "0.2.2"
|
||||
edition = "2024"
|
||||
|
||||
[dependencies]
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,92 +1,111 @@
|
||||
# wsbx
|
||||
|
||||
Docker-Sandboxes-style microVMs on Apple Silicon macOS. Each sandbox is a real Linux VM
|
||||
(Virtualization.framework via [vfkit]), booted from any OCI image with a Kata Containers kernel.
|
||||
Linux microVMs for coding agents on Apple Silicon macOS. Each sandbox is a real VM
|
||||
(Virtualization.framework via [vfkit]) booted from any OCI image with a Kata Containers kernel.
|
||||
|
||||
## Install
|
||||
|
||||
```sh
|
||||
brew install vfkit e2fsprogs go # go: builds the static guest tunnel helper
|
||||
cargo install --path . # or grab wsbx-*-darwin-arm64.tar.gz from a release (push a v* tag to build one)
|
||||
|
||||
wsbx claude # Claude Code in a VM, current dir mounted at the same path
|
||||
wsbx codex | wsbx gemini # other agents (Docker's sandbox-templates images)
|
||||
wsbx pi # pi coding agent, same version + config as on the host
|
||||
wsbx run alpine # bare VM, interactive shell
|
||||
wsbx run -w . ubuntu -- make test # one-off command, exit code propagated
|
||||
wsbx run -p 8000 alpine # host's localhost:8000 reachable as localhost:8000 in the VM
|
||||
wsbx exec NAME # shell in a running sandbox (alias: sh), as the image's user
|
||||
wsbx exec -u root NAME -- apk add git # command, exit code propagated
|
||||
wsbx forward NAME 3000 8080:80 # sandbox's localhost:3000 on the Mac's localhost:3000 (until Ctrl-C; alias fwd)
|
||||
wsbx code NAME # VS Code in the browser, running in the sandbox (until Ctrl-C)
|
||||
wsbx code NAME --desktop # desktop VS Code via Remote-SSH; also: ssh NAME.wsbx
|
||||
wsbx ps # sandboxes: status, CPU, memory, net/block I/O, PIDs, disk, image (alias: ls)
|
||||
wsbx ps -f # same, refreshed every second like `docker stats`
|
||||
wsbx rm NAME... # delete stopped sandboxes; --disk deletes only the disk (fresh on next start)
|
||||
wsbx pull IMAGE
|
||||
wsbx gc # delete cached images no sandbox uses
|
||||
wsbx kernel [--update | --version TAG] # latest Kata release by default, sha256-verified
|
||||
brew install vfkit e2fsprogs
|
||||
curl -fsSL https://git.nhaiden.io/niklas/woiken-sandboxes/raw/branch/main/install.sh | sh
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Defaults for `--cpus`/`--memory` come from the host (half the cores, a quarter of RAM up to 8 GiB). Image tags
|
||||
are re-resolved after 24 h (cached copy used when offline); the superseded image is deleted automatically. `WSBX_KATA_VERSION` pins the kernel release.
|
||||
Installs the latest release to `~/.local/bin` (sha256-checked). `WSBX_VERSION=v0.2.1` pins a release,
|
||||
`WSBX_INSTALL_DIR` changes the target. From source: `brew install go && cargo install --path .`.
|
||||
|
||||
Options: `--name --workspace --cpus --memory --disk --env K[=V] --host-port/-p PORT --fresh --pull --kernel`.
|
||||
## Usage
|
||||
|
||||
**exec**: host → vfkit unix socket (`exec.sock`) → vsock → guest helper. It runs in the workspace dir with the sandbox's env.
|
||||
You get a pty (with resize) when stdin and stdout are terminals, plain pipes otherwise, so `wsbx exec x -- cat f > out` is byte-exact.
|
||||
```sh
|
||||
wsbx claude | codex | gemini | pi # agent in a VM, current dir mounted at the same path
|
||||
wsbx run -w . ubuntu -- make test # any image, one-off command, exit code propagated
|
||||
wsbx run -p 8000 alpine # host localhost:8000 reachable inside the VM
|
||||
wsbx exec NAME [-- cmd] # shell/command in a running sandbox (-u root)
|
||||
wsbx forward NAME 3000 8080:80 # guest localhost ports on the Mac's localhost
|
||||
wsbx code NAME [--desktop] # VS Code in the browser, or desktop via Remote-SSH (ssh NAME.wsbx)
|
||||
wsbx ps [-f] # status, CPU, memory, I/O, disk
|
||||
wsbx rm NAME... [--disk] | wsbx pull IMAGE | wsbx gc | wsbx kernel [--update]
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**forward**: host `127.0.0.1:HOSTPORT` → `exec.sock` → vsock → guest helper → guest `localhost:PORT`, one exec-style session
|
||||
per connection. Works for services bound only to the guest's loopback, on running sandboxes, no restart. `0:PORT` picks a free host port.
|
||||
Run options: `--name --workspace --cpus --memory --disk --env K[=V] -p PORT --fresh --pull --kernel`.
|
||||
Agents: `--keys` forwards API keys; `pi` mirrors the host's pi version and config (`--pi-auth` adds `auth.json`).
|
||||
|
||||
**code**: browser mode fetches the official VS Code CLI into the sandbox (`~/.wsbx-vscode`, needs internet in the VM) and runs
|
||||
`code serve-web` on the guest's loopback, forwarded like `forward` to a random host port behind a random connection token.
|
||||
The CLI downloads the matching server on first open (glibc or Alpine images). `--desktop` writes `~/.wsbx/ssh_config` (a `NAME.wsbx`
|
||||
host per sandbox) and adds an `Include` for it at the top of `~/.ssh/config` once. ssh reaches an SSH server in the guest helper through `wsbx exec`
|
||||
(`ProxyCommand`): no port, no keys, you're the image user. Remote-SSH then installs its server in the VM as usual.
|
||||
If the VM was killed mid-download and the server won't start, delete `~/.vscode/cli/serve-web` (browser) or `~/.vscode-server` (desktop) in the sandbox.
|
||||
Both need a sandbox started by this wsbx version (the guest helper ships with each start).
|
||||
## Architecture
|
||||
|
||||
**Host tunnel** (`-p PORT`): guest `localhost:PORT` → vsock → vfkit → unix socket → host `localhost:PORT`.
|
||||
Nothing listens on a host network interface, and only the listed ports are reachable.
|
||||
```mermaid
|
||||
flowchart LR
|
||||
reg[("OCI registry")]
|
||||
subgraph host["macOS host"]
|
||||
cli["wsbx"]
|
||||
img[("~/.wsbx/images<br/>flattened rootfs.tar")]
|
||||
sbx[("~/.wsbx/sandboxes/NAME<br/>disk.img · meta.json")]
|
||||
share["share/<br/>init · run.sh · guest helper"]
|
||||
ws["workspace"]
|
||||
socks["exec.sock · pPORT.sock"]
|
||||
end
|
||||
subgraph vm["Linux microVM"]
|
||||
init["busybox init (PID 1)"]
|
||||
run["run.sh (root)"]
|
||||
cmd["agent / command<br/>(image user)"]
|
||||
helper["guest helper"]
|
||||
end
|
||||
reg -->|"verify, flatten"| cli --> img
|
||||
cli -->|"spawns vfkit"| vm
|
||||
img -.->|"virtio-blk ro, first boot only"| init
|
||||
sbx -->|"virtio-blk /"| init
|
||||
share -->|"virtio-fs /.wsbx/host"| init
|
||||
init --> run --> cmd
|
||||
run --> helper
|
||||
ws -->|"virtio-fs, same path"| cmd
|
||||
socks <-->|"vsock"| helper
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**pi**: installs `@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent` at the host's `pi --version` (reinstalls when it changes).
|
||||
On every start it copies these from `~/.pi/agent` with symlinks resolved: settings, models, keybindings, mcp, AGENTS/CLAUDE/SYSTEM md files,
|
||||
extensions, skills, prompts, themes. They're linked into the guest's own `~/.pi/agent`, so host edits
|
||||
win and in-VM edits are discarded. `npm/`, `bin/` (macOS binaries) and sessions stay in the VM. `auth.json` is only
|
||||
copied with `--pi-auth`. Local `baseUrl`s in `models.json` (127.0.0.1/localhost) are tunneled automatically.
|
||||
Agent API keys (`ANTHROPIC_API_KEY`, `OPENAI_API_KEY`, …) are only forwarded with `--keys`. Code in the VM can read them.
|
||||
Sandboxes persist per name (disk under `~/.wsbx/sandboxes`); `--fresh` rebuilds. See `PLAN.md` for design.
|
||||
```mermaid
|
||||
sequenceDiagram
|
||||
participant H as wsbx (host)
|
||||
participant V as vfkit
|
||||
participant G as guest
|
||||
H->>H: pull image (cache, tags re-resolved after 24 h)
|
||||
H->>H: first start: write meta.json, mke2fs disk seeded with busybox + stub init
|
||||
H->>H: recreate share/ (init, run.sh, guest helper)
|
||||
H->>V: boot kernel, disk, share, workspace, vsock
|
||||
V->>G: stub init mounts share, execs current init
|
||||
G->>G: first boot: untar image from read-only disk
|
||||
G->>G: run.sh: env, mounts, start helper, drop to image user
|
||||
G-->>H: exit code via share/exit, then poweroff
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
[vfkit]: https://github.com/crc-org/vfkit
|
||||
- **One process per VM.** The VM lives as long as its command; the exit code comes back through the share.
|
||||
- **Persistent disk, fresh plumbing.** `disk.img` (sparse ext4) keeps the guest's state between runs; init, `run.sh`
|
||||
and the guest helper are rewritten into the share on every start, so upgrading wsbx upgrades existing sandboxes.
|
||||
- **Own OCI client.** Anonymous pulls of linux/arm64 images, layers flattened on the host (whiteouts applied),
|
||||
cached by digest. No Docker needed.
|
||||
- **No host network exposure.** `exec`, `forward`, `code` and `-p` tunnels all run over vsock through unix
|
||||
sockets in the sandbox dir; host-side listeners bind loopback only. Guest egress is vfkit NAT.
|
||||
- **Code layout.** Host: `src/*.rs`. Guest helper (exec, port forwarding, SSH for VS Code): `guest/*.go`,
|
||||
cross-compiled by `build.rs` and embedded in the binary. Design notes: `PLAN.md`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Security model
|
||||
|
||||
The VM is the boundary. The guest (including a prompt-injected agent or a malicious image) is assumed hostile.
|
||||
The VM is the boundary. The guest, including a prompt-injected agent or a malicious image, is assumed hostile.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Control share** (`/.wsbx/host`): the guest can write to it, so it's recreated empty on every start while the VM is stopped and
|
||||
deleted after exit. Guest outputs are read only as regular files with a size cap; persistent state lives in the host-only
|
||||
`meta.json`.
|
||||
- **vfkit arguments**: paths containing `,` `"` or control characters are refused (vfkit splits options on commas).
|
||||
Workspaces overlapping `~/.wsbx` are refused.
|
||||
- **Registry**: references are validated before any request, digest pins are enforced, and every blob/manifest is sha256-verified.
|
||||
Auth realms must be https. For public registries, connections to loopback/private/link-local addresses are refused
|
||||
(token realms and redirects included).
|
||||
- **pi config**: allowlisted items only. Symlinks are followed only into `~/.pi/agent` or `~/.agents/skills`, with no cycles
|
||||
and no special files, capped at 256 MB.
|
||||
- **exec**: sessions run as root before dropping to the user, so the guest helper accepts them only from the host's vsock CID,
|
||||
not from guest processes via vsock loopback.
|
||||
- **forward**: listens on the host's loopback only. Browsers don't isolate `localhost` cookies by port, so a forwarded guest
|
||||
page can read non-HttpOnly cookies your other localhost apps set. Forward only what you need.
|
||||
- **code**: the SSH server is only reachable through `wsbx exec` (your user's `~/.wsbx`), so it skips auth, with an ephemeral host key.
|
||||
It allows sessions and host → guest forwarding only; guest → host forwarding (`-R`) and agent forwarding are refused. Desktop VS Code
|
||||
auto-forwards ports the guest opens to your localhost (turn off `remote.autoForwardPorts` if unwanted), and its client
|
||||
trusts the remote server more than a browser tab does. The browser mode has the same localhost-cookie caveat as `forward`.
|
||||
- **Host tunnel**: only the ports you pass with `-p` (or the local `baseUrl`s in pi's `models.json`), over vsock.
|
||||
- **Control share**: guest-writable, so it's recreated empty on every start and deleted after exit. Guest outputs are
|
||||
read only as small regular files; persistent state lives in host-only `meta.json`.
|
||||
- **Image**: env keys must be shell identifiers; the command runs as the image's user.
|
||||
- **vfkit arguments**: paths with `,` `"` or control characters are refused. Workspaces overlapping `~/.wsbx` are refused.
|
||||
- **Registry**: references validated, digest pins enforced, every blob/manifest sha256-verified, auth realms https-only.
|
||||
Connections to loopback/private/link-local addresses are refused, including auth realms, redirects and IPv6 forms (NAT64, 6to4).
|
||||
A registry is local only if named `localhost` or a private IP literal; use the IP for LAN registries. 30 s network timeouts.
|
||||
- **Guest base**: busybox (PID 1) is pinned by digest; the kernel is sha256-checked against the Kata release.
|
||||
- **exec**: the guest helper accepts sessions only from the host's vsock CID, not from guest processes.
|
||||
- **code**: the in-guest SSH server is reachable only through `wsbx exec`, allows no `-R` or agent forwarding.
|
||||
- **pi config**: allowlisted files only; symlinks only into `~/.pi/agent` or `~/.agents/skills`, capped at 256 MB.
|
||||
|
||||
Remaining risks:
|
||||
- The workspace is read-write. A guest can plant files that run later on the host (`.git/hooks`, `.envrc`,
|
||||
IDE tasks, package scripts). Review changes before running them on the host.
|
||||
- Egress is unrestricted NAT. Anything the VM holds (keys passed with `--keys`, API keys in pi's `models.json`, `--pi-auth`)
|
||||
can be exfiltrated. A host-side credential-injecting egress proxy would fix this; it isn't built yet.
|
||||
- A kernel panic before the root disk mounts (e.g. a corrupt `disk.img`) still restart-loops; panics after boot stop
|
||||
the VM (exit 1).
|
||||
- Image layers are unpacked on the host into one tar, so a decompression bomb can fill the disk.
|
||||
- The workspace is read-write: a guest can plant files that later run on the host (`.git/hooks`, `.envrc`, package scripts).
|
||||
- Egress is unrestricted, so anything in the VM (`--keys`, pi's `models.json`, `--pi-auth`) can be exfiltrated.
|
||||
- Browsers share `localhost` cookies across ports: a page served via `forward` or `code` can read your other localhost apps' cookies.
|
||||
Desktop VS Code also auto-forwards guest ports (`remote.autoForwardPorts`).
|
||||
- Image layers are unpacked on the host, so a decompression bomb can fill the disk.
|
||||
- A kernel panic before the root disk mounts restart-loops; later panics stop the VM.
|
||||
|
||||
[vfkit]: https://github.com/crc-org/vfkit
|
||||
|
||||
Executable
+29
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
|
||||
#!/bin/sh
|
||||
# Install wsbx from a release: curl -fsSL https://git.nhaiden.io/niklas/woiken-sandboxes/raw/branch/main/install.sh | sh
|
||||
# Env: WSBX_VERSION (tag, default: latest release), WSBX_INSTALL_DIR (default: ~/.local/bin)
|
||||
set -eu
|
||||
|
||||
REPO=https://git.nhaiden.io/niklas/woiken-sandboxes
|
||||
DIR=${WSBX_INSTALL_DIR:-$HOME/.local/bin}
|
||||
|
||||
[ "$(uname -s)-$(uname -m)" = Darwin-arm64 ] || { echo "wsbx needs macOS on Apple Silicon" >&2; exit 1; }
|
||||
|
||||
TAG=${WSBX_VERSION:-$(curl -fsSL https://git.nhaiden.io/api/v1/repos/niklas/woiken-sandboxes/releases/latest | sed -n 's/.*"tag_name":"\([^"]*\)".*/\1/p')}
|
||||
[ -n "$TAG" ] || { echo "could not determine the latest release" >&2; exit 1; }
|
||||
F="wsbx-$TAG-darwin-arm64.tar.gz"
|
||||
|
||||
TMP=$(mktemp -d)
|
||||
trap 'rm -rf "$TMP"' EXIT
|
||||
cd "$TMP"
|
||||
echo "downloading $F"
|
||||
curl -fsSLO "$REPO/releases/download/$TAG/$F"
|
||||
curl -fsSLO "$REPO/releases/download/$TAG/$F.sha256"
|
||||
shasum -a 256 -c "$F.sha256" >/dev/null || { echo "checksum mismatch for $F" >&2; exit 1; }
|
||||
tar -xzf "$F" wsbx
|
||||
|
||||
mkdir -p "$DIR"
|
||||
install -m 755 wsbx "$DIR/wsbx"
|
||||
echo "installed $("$DIR/wsbx" --version) to $DIR/wsbx"
|
||||
|
||||
case ":$PATH:" in *":$DIR:"*) ;; *) echo "note: $DIR is not on your PATH" ;; esac
|
||||
command -v vfkit >/dev/null || echo "note: wsbx needs vfkit and e2fsprogs: brew install vfkit e2fsprogs"
|
||||
+5
-1
@@ -13,13 +13,17 @@ const STUB_INIT: &str = "#!/.wsbx/busybox sh
|
||||
echo 'wsbx: cannot mount host share'; exec /.wsbx/busybox sh
|
||||
";
|
||||
|
||||
/// busybox:musl pinned by digest: this binary is PID 1 in every VM, so a moved tag must not change it.
|
||||
/// Bump deliberately (index digest of `docker.io/library/busybox:musl`).
|
||||
const BUSYBOX: &str = "busybox@sha256:ea2b9914a16a4ac1981994af97b318f7c7d4db76b580c56177f08bf76f4a0be8";
|
||||
|
||||
/// Static busybox from the official busybox image; runs PID 1 + helpers in the guest.
|
||||
fn busybox(h: &Path) -> Result<PathBuf> {
|
||||
let p = h.join("busybox");
|
||||
if p.exists() {
|
||||
return Ok(p);
|
||||
}
|
||||
let img = oci::pull(h, "busybox:musl", false)?;
|
||||
let img = oci::pull(h, BUSYBOX, false)?;
|
||||
let tmp = h.join("busybox.tmp");
|
||||
fs::create_dir_all(&tmp)?;
|
||||
let ok = Command::new("tar").arg("-xf").arg(&img.rootfs).arg("-C").arg(&tmp).arg("bin").status()?.success();
|
||||
|
||||
+3
-2
@@ -34,7 +34,8 @@ pub fn kernel(h: &Path, update: bool, version: Option<String>) -> Result<PathBuf
|
||||
Some(v) => format!("https://api.github.com/repos/{KATA_REPO}/releases/tags/{v}"),
|
||||
None => format!("https://api.github.com/repos/{KATA_REPO}/releases/latest"),
|
||||
};
|
||||
let rel: Value = serde_json::from_reader(ureq::get(&api).call().with_context(|| format!("GET {api}"))?.into_reader())?;
|
||||
let agent = oci::agent_for("api.github.com"); // public-only resolver, like registries (redirects to the CDN included)
|
||||
let rel: Value = serde_json::from_reader(agent.get(&api).call().with_context(|| format!("GET {api}"))?.into_reader())?;
|
||||
let tag = rel["tag_name"].as_str().ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("no tag in {api}"))?;
|
||||
if k.exists() && installed.as_deref() == Some(tag) {
|
||||
eprintln!("wsbx: kernel already at Kata {tag}");
|
||||
@@ -62,7 +63,7 @@ pub fn kernel(h: &Path, update: bool, version: Option<String>) -> Result<PathBuf
|
||||
.stdin(Stdio::piped())
|
||||
.spawn()?;
|
||||
let mut w = oci::HashWriter(tar.stdin.take().unwrap(), Sha256::new());
|
||||
std::io::copy(&mut ureq::get(url).call()?.into_reader(), &mut w)?;
|
||||
std::io::copy(&mut agent.get(url).call()?.into_reader(), &mut w)?;
|
||||
let oci::HashWriter(stdin, hasher) = w;
|
||||
drop(stdin);
|
||||
if !tar.wait()?.success() {
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-1
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ struct Opts {
|
||||
#[arg(long)]
|
||||
kernel: Option<PathBuf>,
|
||||
/// Tunnel the host's localhost:PORT to localhost:PORT in the VM (vsock, no network exposure)
|
||||
#[arg(short = 'p', long = "host-port")]
|
||||
#[arg(short = 'p', long = "host-port", value_parser = clap::value_parser!(u16).range(1..))]
|
||||
host_ports: Vec<u16>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+60
-17
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
|
||||
use std::collections::HashSet;
|
||||
use std::fs::{self, File};
|
||||
use std::io::{BufReader, Read, Write};
|
||||
use std::net::{IpAddr, SocketAddr, ToSocketAddrs};
|
||||
use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr, SocketAddr, ToSocketAddrs};
|
||||
use std::os::unix::fs::MetadataExt;
|
||||
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -60,23 +60,40 @@ pub fn is_public(ip: IpAddr) -> bool {
|
||||
|| o[0] == 0
|
||||
|| (o[0] == 100 && o[1] & 0xc0 == 64)) // CGNAT 100.64/10
|
||||
}
|
||||
IpAddr::V6(v) => match v.to_ipv4_mapped() {
|
||||
Some(v4) => is_public(v4.into()),
|
||||
None => !(v.is_loopback() || v.is_unspecified() || v.is_multicast() || v.is_unique_local() || v.is_unicast_link_local()),
|
||||
},
|
||||
IpAddr::V6(v) => {
|
||||
let v4 = |hi: u16, lo: u16| is_public(Ipv4Addr::from((hi as u32) << 16 | lo as u32).into());
|
||||
match v.segments() {
|
||||
[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xffff, hi, lo] => v4(hi, lo), // IPv4-mapped
|
||||
[0x64, 0xff9b, 0, 0, 0, 0, hi, lo] => v4(hi, lo), // NAT64 well-known prefix
|
||||
[0x2002, hi, lo, ..] => v4(hi, lo), // 6to4
|
||||
[0x2001, 0xdb8, ..] | [0x2001, 0, ..] => false, // documentation, Teredo
|
||||
s => s[0] & 0xe000 == 0x2000, // global unicast 2000::/3 only
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Every HTTP agent: a silent server (connect or any single read, TLS handshake included) fails after 30 s instead of hanging.
|
||||
pub fn agent() -> ureq::AgentBuilder {
|
||||
let t = std::time::Duration::from_secs(30);
|
||||
ureq::AgentBuilder::new().timeout_connect(t).timeout_read(t)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Registry the user named as local: `localhost` or a non-public IP literal. Decided by name only --
|
||||
/// a DNS name pointing at loopback (e.g. *.127.0.0.1.nip.io) is controlled by whoever owns the zone.
|
||||
fn explicit_local(registry: &str) -> bool {
|
||||
let host = registry.split_once(':').map_or(registry, |(h, _)| h);
|
||||
host == "localhost" || host.parse().is_ok_and(|ip| !is_public(ip))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// HTTP agent for a registry. Public registries get an agent that refuses to connect to non-public
|
||||
/// addresses (covers token realms and blob redirects too); a registry that is itself local
|
||||
/// (e.g. localhost:5000) was chosen explicitly by the user and keeps the default agent.
|
||||
fn agent_for(registry: &str) -> ureq::Agent {
|
||||
let addr = if registry.contains(':') { registry.to_string() } else { format!("{registry}:443") };
|
||||
let local = addr.to_socket_addrs().map(|mut a| a.any(|a| !is_public(a.ip()))).unwrap_or(false);
|
||||
if local {
|
||||
return ureq::agent();
|
||||
/// addresses (covers token realms and blob redirects too); an explicitly local registry
|
||||
/// (e.g. localhost:5000, 192.168.1.5:5000) was chosen by the user and keeps the default agent.
|
||||
pub fn agent_for(registry: &str) -> ureq::Agent {
|
||||
if explicit_local(registry) {
|
||||
return agent().build();
|
||||
}
|
||||
ureq::AgentBuilder::new()
|
||||
agent()
|
||||
.resolver(|addr: &str| -> std::io::Result<Vec<SocketAddr>> {
|
||||
let ok: Vec<SocketAddr> = addr.to_socket_addrs()?.filter(|a| is_public(a.ip())).collect();
|
||||
if ok.is_empty() {
|
||||
@@ -199,8 +216,11 @@ pub fn pull(home: &Path, image: &str, refresh: bool) -> Result<Image> {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Flattened name for humans plus a hash of the exact reference, so `a_b:t` and `a/b:t` never share a ref file.
|
||||
/// (Pre-hash ref files are simply ignored: the image is re-resolved and gc drops them.)
|
||||
fn ref_path(home: &Path, image: &str) -> PathBuf {
|
||||
home.join("images/refs").join(image.replace(['/', ':', '@'], "_"))
|
||||
let h = hex::encode(Sha256::digest(image));
|
||||
home.join("images/refs").join(format!("{}-{}", image.replace(['/', ':', '@'], "_"), &h[..16]))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn image_dir(home: &Path, digest: &str) -> PathBuf {
|
||||
@@ -224,7 +244,10 @@ pub fn gc(home: &Path, keep: &[String]) -> Result<u64> {
|
||||
for e in fs::read_dir(home.join("images/refs"))?.flatten() {
|
||||
match fs::read_to_string(e.path()) {
|
||||
Ok(d) if keep.contains(&e.path()) => drop(live.insert(image_dir(home, d.trim()))),
|
||||
_ => fs::remove_file(e.path())?,
|
||||
_ => match fs::remove_file(e.path()) {
|
||||
Err(e) if e.kind() != std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => return Err(e.into()), // gone: a concurrent pull renamed it
|
||||
_ => {}
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
let mut freed = 0;
|
||||
@@ -467,14 +490,26 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn public_addresses() {
|
||||
for ip in ["127.0.0.1", "10.1.2.3", "172.16.0.1", "192.168.64.1", "169.254.169.254", "100.64.0.1", "0.0.0.0", "::1", "fe80::1", "fd00::1", "::ffff:127.0.0.1"] {
|
||||
for ip in ["127.0.0.1", "10.1.2.3", "172.16.0.1", "192.168.64.1", "169.254.169.254", "100.64.0.1", "0.0.0.0", "::1", "fe80::1", "fd00::1", "::ffff:127.0.0.1",
|
||||
"64:ff9b::7f00:1", "64:ff9b::a00:1", "64:ff9b:1::1", "2002:7f00:1::1", "2002:c0a8:101::", "::7f00:1", "::a00:1",
|
||||
"2001:db8::1", "2001::1", "ff02::1"] {
|
||||
assert!(!is_public(ip.parse().unwrap()), "{ip} must be rejected");
|
||||
}
|
||||
for ip in ["8.8.8.8", "140.82.121.4", "2606:4700::6810:84e5"] {
|
||||
for ip in ["8.8.8.8", "140.82.121.4", "2606:4700::6810:84e5", "64:ff9b::808:808", "2002:808:808::1", "::ffff:8.8.8.8"] {
|
||||
assert!(is_public(ip.parse().unwrap()), "{ip} must be allowed");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn local_registries() {
|
||||
for l in ["localhost:5000", "localhost", "127.0.0.1:5000", "192.168.1.5:5000"] {
|
||||
assert!(explicit_local(l), "{l}");
|
||||
}
|
||||
for r in ["evil.127.0.0.1.nip.io:8443", "localhost.evil.com", "ghcr.io", "8.8.8.8:443", "registry-1.docker.io"] {
|
||||
assert!(!explicit_local(r), "{r}");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn bad_refs() {
|
||||
for bad in ["alpine@sha256:../../x", "../x", "a/../b", "alpine:../x", "Alpine", "a//b"] {
|
||||
@@ -485,6 +520,14 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn ref_paths_distinct() {
|
||||
let h = Path::new("/h");
|
||||
assert_ne!(ref_path(h, "evil_bar:v1"), ref_path(h, "evil/bar:v1"));
|
||||
assert_ne!(ref_path(h, "docker_sandbox-templates_claude-code"), ref_path(h, "docker/sandbox-templates:claude-code"));
|
||||
assert_eq!(ref_path(h, "alpine"), ref_path(h, "alpine"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn digests() {
|
||||
assert!(check_digest(&format!("sha256:{}", "a".repeat(64))).is_ok());
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-2
@@ -88,9 +88,9 @@ fn rows(h: &Path) -> Result<Vec<Row>> {
|
||||
let Ok(rd) = fs::read_dir(h.join("sandboxes")) else { return Ok(vec![]) };
|
||||
let mut rows = vec![];
|
||||
for e in rd.flatten() {
|
||||
let Ok(m) = fs::read(e.path().join("meta.json")) else { continue };
|
||||
let Some(meta) = fs::read(e.path().join("meta.json")).ok().and_then(|m| serde_json::from_slice(&m).ok()) else { continue };
|
||||
let running = lock_stopped(&e.path()).is_err();
|
||||
rows.push(Row { name: e.file_name().to_string_lossy().into(), dir: e.path(), meta: serde_json::from_slice(&m)?, running });
|
||||
rows.push(Row { name: e.file_name().to_string_lossy().into(), dir: e.path(), meta, running });
|
||||
}
|
||||
rows.sort_by(|a, b| a.name.cmp(&b.name));
|
||||
Ok(rows)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -76,9 +76,10 @@ pub fn run(h: &Path, o: Opts, image: &str, cmd: Vec<String>, extra: &[String], g
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !disk.exists() {
|
||||
eprintln!("wsbx: creating sandbox {name}");
|
||||
create_disk(h, &disk, o.disk)?;
|
||||
// meta first: it marks the image as in use for `wsbx gc` and makes a crashed create visible to ps/rm
|
||||
meta = json!({"image": image, "digest": img.digest, "workspace": ws, "created": now(), "provisioned": false});
|
||||
fs::write(&meta_path, serde_json::to_vec_pretty(&meta)?)?;
|
||||
create_disk(h, &disk, o.disk)?;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Build the guest-side run script (executed as root by init, then drops to the image user).
|
||||
@@ -119,8 +120,9 @@ pub fn run(h: &Path, o: Opts, image: &str, cmd: Vec<String>, extra: &[String], g
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
for e in env {
|
||||
if let Some((k, v)) = e.split_once('=') {
|
||||
s += &format!("export {k}={}\n", sq(v));
|
||||
match export(&e) {
|
||||
Some(line) => s += &line,
|
||||
None => eprintln!("wsbx: skipping env entry with invalid name: {e:?}"),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
s += &format!("export WSBX_USER={}\n", sq(&user));
|
||||
@@ -241,6 +243,13 @@ pub fn run(h: &Path, o: Opts, image: &str, cmd: Vec<String>, extra: &[String], g
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// `export K='v'` line; None unless K is a shell identifier (image Env is hostile and run.sh runs as root).
|
||||
fn export(e: &str) -> Option<String> {
|
||||
let (k, v) = e.split_once('=')?;
|
||||
let ok = k.bytes().next().is_some_and(|b| b.is_ascii_alphabetic() || b == b'_') && k.bytes().all(|b| b.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || b == b'_');
|
||||
ok.then(|| format!("export {k}={}\n", sq(v)))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Small result file written by the guest; regular files only (no symlinks), size-capped.
|
||||
fn guest_output(share: &Path, name: &str) -> Option<String> {
|
||||
let p = share.join(name);
|
||||
@@ -282,6 +291,14 @@ pub fn term_size() -> Option<(u16, u16)> {
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use std::path::Path;
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn env_keys() {
|
||||
assert_eq!(super::export("_A1=x y").as_deref(), Some("export _A1='x y'\n"));
|
||||
for bad in ["PWN$(id > /ws/pwn)=x", "=x", "1A=x", "A B=x", "A;id=x", "noequals"] {
|
||||
assert!(super::export(bad).is_none(), "{bad}");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn vfkit_injection_rejected() {
|
||||
assert!(super::vf(Path::new("/Users/me/repo")).is_ok());
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user